

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Friday, 13 April 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. HAJEK

(Czechoslovakia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. de MELLO-FRANCO  
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS  
Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. N. MINTCHEV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U.Tin MAUNG  
A Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. E. PEPIKH  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLU  
Mr. M. HAMID  
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA  
Mr. M.B. NAIR

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGIATI  
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. A. de ICAZA

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA  
Mr. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. LACHS  
Mr. M. BIEN  
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. M. MALITZA  
Mr. C. SANDRU  
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG  
Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. H. BLIX  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN  
Mr. M.S. AHMED  
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK  
Mr. J.H. LAMBERT

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. R.I. SPIERS  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): I declare open the twentieth meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): A long discussion has been taking place in our Committee on the first article of the treaty on general and complete disarmament which this Conference has undertaken to draw up. We should like to express our satisfaction that, generally speaking, this discussion has proceeded in a spirit of conciliation and collaboration, in spite of the differences of opinion on certain points in the future treaty.

Several speakers have stressed that, in spite of certain differences in expression, there is agreement on the substance of a great many very important points relating to the first article of the treaty. This was to be expected, if only because there is an agreement on the principles of general and complete disarmament set out in the Joint Statement by the Soviet Union and the United States (ENDC/5) -- the two Powers which possess the greatest military potential and for that very reason must assume special responsibilities in regard to disarmament.

In his statement on 6 April (ENDC/PV.16) Mr. Godber, the representative of the United Kingdom, referred to a considerable number of points of agreement on the substance of the problems under consideration. We do not wish to go into the different problems in detail, but we are happy to observe that the Western Powers, of which Mr. Godber is one of the spokesmen, agree with his findings. The identity of views between the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States, in particular, which was admitted by the United Kingdom representative himself in his statement yesterday, albeit on another question connected with disarmament, should ensure that our work on the drafting of article 1 will be greatly facilitated. A certain number of points of agreement on substance were also pointed out by the representative of Italy, who spoke on this question at the meeting of 11 April (ENDC/PV.18).

After the explanations given and the attempt at compromise made by the representative of India, it seems that agreement is also near on another point -- a very important one for a treaty on general and complete disarmament -- namely, that there should be a specific time-limit for implementing the treaty.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

It is true that there was a rather lively discussion on this question at the meeting of 11 April, as at that of 6 April. However, the general impression given by the statements of all delegations is that in their opinion a treaty without a specific time-limit would be a promise without a guarantee of fulfilment -- a promise with no binding force.

For our part, we consider that the time-limit proposed by the Soviet Union for carrying out general and complete disarmament is perfectly realistic and would be of great value. In his last intervention (ENDC/PV.18, pages 38 et seq.) Mr. Lall, the representative of India, gave a brilliant demonstration of the advantage of having a fixed time-limit, as short as possible, for carrying out the whole process of general and complete disarmament.

Other representatives mentioned more or less specific time-limits. For instance Mr. Krishna Menon, the Indian Minister of Defence, said in his first statement: "Either we disarm pretty quickly or the process of re-arming will go on" (ENDC/PV.5, page 27). He proposed, on behalf of his Government a period of four or five years, which he thought perfectly realistic and practicable.

Mr. Rusk, the representative of the United States, in his statement of 27 March, mentioned a period of three years for the first stage, whereas Lord Home suggested nine years for carrying out the whole process of general and complete disarmament.

We consider that the periods mentioned by these two representatives of the Western Powers -- those of the United States and the United Kingdom -- are too long. Moreover, that was also the opinion of the United States two years ago, when the question was discussed at the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Speaking at that time during the discussion on general and complete disarmament, Mr. Wadsworth, representative of the United States, said that his personal belief was that, if a start were made promptly, the step-by-step process towards that goal could be completed in five or six years and, with good will and a proper sense of the urgency of the problem on all sides, would require even less time (AC.1/PV.1093).

The urgency of the problem and the importance of the time factor were also very strongly emphasized by Mr. Rusk, the Secretary of State, who, in his statement of 27 March, pointed out the need "to reverse the upward spiral of destructive capability which, if unchecked, could by 1966 be double what it is today" (ENDC/PV.10, page 15).

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

From all these statements it is clear that, generally speaking, there is agreement on having a fixed time-limit for carrying out general and complete disarmament. At the same time it has become apparent that the positions of the major Powers concerned are drawing closer together on the question of a time-limit, the Soviet Union proposing four years and the United States having proposed, in the past, five to six years — a period which, if it adheres to its statements made at the time, could of course be shortened, according to what the United States representative said himself.

If we could reach final agreement — and from the statements made both in the past and at this Conference, it appears that we could — on this important point that disarmament should be carried out within a fixed period, we should still have to discuss and agree on one or two other points which, it is true, are of considerable importance in the series of obligations which States would have to assume in order that general and complete disarmament may be achieved.

I should like to make a few comments, first of all on one of these points, which is of exceptional importance for my country. This is the question of military bases in foreign territory.

Article 1 of the draft submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2) provides that the destruction and cessation of the production of all means of delivering weapons of mass destruction shall be accompanied by the dismantling of foreign military bases. The United States draft mentions the elimination of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, but makes no provision for the liquidation of foreign military bases. As a country surrounded by a profusion of foreign military bases, at which intensive military preparations are going on every day with a view to aggression, should occasion arise, against the socialist countries in general and our country in particular, the People's Republic of Bulgaria is particularly interested in the removal of these centres for the preparation of war on foreign soil by certain of the Great Powers.

We wish to stress that the very existence of these bases is a source of international tension and creates suspicion and tension between States. They are calculated to worsen the international atmosphere in regions where, if they did not exist, the peoples could, and certainly would, find a way to reach an understanding and live in peace with one another.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

It may be that some representatives of Western countries who have spoken on this question see no difference between national bases and foreign military bases. Seen from within their own countries, with guns and rockets aimed at other countries, these bases may be a comforting sight for certain circles in the West. But we are sure that the peoples of these countries cannot share such feelings and cannot regard these bases as being on the same footing as national bases. The feeling of satisfaction in certain circles at the presence of foreign troops and bases on their national territory cannot, in our opinion, be shared by peoples who are not accustomed to seeing foreign troops on their soil in time of peace.

But what is more important is that these foreign bases, with their guns and rockets aimed at the towns and industrial centres of other countries, cannot be viewed with the same satisfaction by the peoples of the countries at which these guns and rockets are aimed. In our country there are no foreign military bases and no foreign troops. But we are bound to note that all round our frontiers there are foreign military bases -- NATO bases and United States bases -- in great numbers.

The meaning and the danger of these foreign military bases was strikingly summed up by the representative of Czechoslovakia at the meeting of 6 April 1962, when he said:

"In our opinion it cannot be denied that military bases on foreign territory have a quite specific military, strategic and political mission. One need only take into account some elements --their geographical dispersion, technical facilities and other relevant facts --to see at first sight that these bases are substantially different from national bases, and from the point of view of the danger of a sudden outbreak of war constitute an exceptionally important category of military potential". (ENDC/PV.16, page 7).

The harmful influence of foreign military bases on relations between States was also very clearly condemned by the representative of India. Speaking on 11 April 1962, Mr. Lall said:

"We ourselves fully realise that the question of foreign bases is a matter of concern from the point of view of certain countries."

(ENDC/PV.18, page 37)

There is no doubt that the question of the destruction of delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction is indissolubly linked with the dismantling of military bases on foreign territory. Moreover, it is evident that, if military



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bases on foreign soil were not liquidated at the same time as the delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction, a potential aggressor could have weapons of mass destruction brought near to the frontiers of other countries against which such bases are directed and set up ready for use there. If we reached agreement on delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction without deciding on the simultaneous dismantling of military bases on foreign territory, that could only raise doubts about the real intention of certain States to destroy all the means of delivering weapons of mass destruction; for those States could be suspected of wishing to keep such weapons in order to use them for aggressive ends.

To provide for destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons without at the same time undertaking to dismantle military bases on foreign territory would, moreover, be contrary to the agreed principles, in particular the principle stated in paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement, according to which:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all". (ENDC/5, page 2)

Another question to which delegations have given attention is whether the future treaty on general and complete disarmament should lay down obligations or objectives, as proposed in the United States draft, in the general statement of the undertakings to be given by States in the first part of the treaty. We think that the first part of the treaty should specify the obligations of States in regard to the global concept of general and complete disarmament. These are articles of deep political significance, which define the essential task and, in a general way, the essential content, as regards the actual measures for general and complete disarmament. That is why it is important, even indispensable, that the first part should determine in a general way the undertakings and obligations, not the objectives or general principles, on which agreement has already been reached in the Joint Statement of 20 September 1961. Mr. Godber, United Kingdom representative, rightly said on 6 April: "True, the word 'obligations' is, I suppose, more precise in its effect." (ENDC/PV.16, page 10).

It should be noted that all the undertakings in article 1 of the Soviet draft on disarmament represent a subsequent elaboration of the principles contained in the Joint Statement by the Soviet Union and the United States. Their

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implementation in the treaty would also make it possible to fulfil the main task assigned to our Conference by the United Nations General Assembly: to build a world without arms and without war.

At this stage in the discussion it is important, even essential, to reach general agreement on the whole scope of measures for general and complete disarmament, before proceeding to a more detailed examination of implementation measures, stage by stage, and of the content of the various measures to be taken while each particular stage is being carried out. As several delegations stressed at previous meetings, in formulating the provisions of the first part of the treaty we should take a step forward: we should amplify and give a more definite form to the various principles already agreed on, not merely reiterate principles already agreed and approved by all of the Member States in resolution 1722(XVI) of the United Nations General Assembly.

Having defined, during this discussion, all the areas of agreement on the twelve points --or on a greater number of points --and having defined the positions of certain delegations on a number of questions, we should entrust the two co-Chairmen with the task, however difficult, of working out a joint text for submission to our Conference. Up to now that procedure has proved the most effective and expeditious, so it would be advisable to go on applying it.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I want to speak very briefly today on some of the points that were discussed at our eighteenth meeting on Wednesday in connexion with the first part of the treaty on general and complete disarmament which we are drafting.

However, I should like first to answer the following question which the representative of the Soviet Union put to me yesterday:

"Are the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom prepared to give an undertaking not to carry out such tests? I have already informed the Conference of the Soviet Government's stand on this question. Our reply is in the affirmative." (ENDC/PV.19, page 41)

I referred to my Government the question put by the representative of the Soviet Union, and I now wish to read into the record a statement issued in Washington yesterday by my Government:

(Mr. Dean, United States)

"The statement today by the Soviet Union that a new uninspected moratorium on nuclear tests should be undertaken for as long as the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference remains in session is another unfortunate effort to substitute paper pledges for guaranteed agreements.

"The United States hopes that this statement is not the final answer of the Soviet Government to the joint United States-United Kingdom message of 10 April on nuclear testing, which clearly states the position of the two Governments towards this vital issue.

"The United States is deeply sensitive to the apprehensions which have been expressed by the eight new nations at the Geneva Conference regarding nuclear testing, but it does not believe that a solution to this vital issue can result from paper pledges. Rather, it is essential that the Conference direct its energies to reaching an agreement on adequate verification arrangements which will result in a safeguarded agreement. This is where an answer to the world's desire for an end to all nuclear testing will be found. This latest Soviet proposal must be judged in the light of the actions of the Soviet Government last Fall during the course of the test ban Conference. Even as these discussions were continuing the Soviet Union resumed tests, thus ending the unpoliced moratorium which it now proposes to reinstate.

"The United States does not intend to place its security and the security of its allies at the mercy of Soviet on-again, off-again tactics. We are ready to conclude an effective test ban agreement now, but we cannot be led into another paper pledge which, far from guaranteeing a halt to nuclear testing, would only give rise to a false sense of security and provide yet another opportunity for the Soviet Union to prepare in secret for its own nuclear testing."

I would now like to revert to our discussion on the treaty for general and complete disarmament which we are in process of drafting.

I was much encouraged by the discussion at our eighteenth meeting on Wednesday, for I believe there was a drawing together of positions in some important respects. I hope and trust that this is not illusory. However, before pressing on to a further drafting stage I would like to present once more the views of the United States on three of the issues which arose in our discussion. These issues are as follows:

(Mr. Dean, United States)

1. The nature of the section of the agreement we are now drafting -- whether it is a statement of purposes or a statement of obligations;
2. The question of foreign bases, which the representative of Bulgaria has discussed this morning; and
3. The question of time limits in a programme of general and complete disarmament.

In his statement on Wednesday Mr. Zorin, referring to what I had said regarding the fact that the obligations to be undertaken by States comprised the sum total of the agreements we will have reached, said:

"The observation by Mr. Dean which I quoted makes it clear that, in his opinion, the document being prepared by the Eighteen Nation Committee will comprise the sum total of the agreements which are reached in the course of the discussion. But it may be asked what assurance there is that this sum total will be equivalent to general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.18, page 25)

If that is Mr. Zorin's preoccupation, let me assure my Soviet colleague that this issue need give us no further difficulty whatsoever. In our view, the purpose of the Part I that we propose in document ENDC/18 is to set forth, in a capsulized form, what the total treaty on general and complete disarmament will accomplish. This part should make it quite clear that the sum total of the treaty would -- to use Mr. Zorin's words -- be equivalent to general and complete disarmament.

But this is quite different from saying that this part in and of itself sets forth obligations. Let me be very clear. We do not wish to be put into a position in which, having accepted certain obligations in Part I, we later come to a point in our drafting of the entire treaty where we are told that the particular obligation has already been accepted and that there is no point in discussing further details of that obligation.

We are quite prepared to consider a different title for this part in order to get on with our work, such as, for example, "Scope of the treaty", or "Purposes of the treaty", or "Objectives of the treaty", or even, as Mr. Godber of the United Kingdom and Mr. Lall of India both suggested, "Outline of obligations" or "Outline of obligations to be assumed in the treaty". In other words, we want to know, before we sign, what it is we are signing.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The important thing is that we recognize quite clearly that we are not drafting articles that will have any independent status apart from the remainder of the treaty, and that what we are doing in effect is to come to agreement among ourselves on a summarization of what the treaty, in its entirety, will accomplish when it is drafted completely.

Let me be very clear. We do not question that our ultimate objective in this Conference is to draft binding agreements on general and complete disarmament. We have no question about that at all -- in fact, that is the end point of our work at this Conference. We ourselves have stated our belief that the actual drafting of final treaty language should merely be deferred until after the resolution of the substantive issues which still need to be worked out before a final agreement can be drafted. We make this suggestion not in any sense to delay but rather to accelerate our work and to avoid dawdling over non-essentials before we have arrived at the fundamentals.

However, we seem to be progressing fairly satisfactorily so far without having to settle this somewhat abstract issue. My delegation will be quite happy to go ahead and try to reach agreement between the different drafts on Part I in the light of the discussion which has so far taken place here.

Let me now turn to the second question. The second question which occasioned some exchange of views on Wednesday was that of foreign bases. I can do no more than associate myself entirely with the remarks of the representatives of Italy and the United Kingdom on this question.

The United States believes that a disarmament agreement should deal with all types of military installations, whether they are located within the territory or outside the territory of a particular party to the treaty; we do not think this makes any difference.

We have made it quite clear in our proposed Part I that the disarmament programme must provide for the dismantling of military establishments including bases. It will be noted that we do not say "some bases", or "certain bases"; we say "bases". But we are quite prepared to consider the suggestion of the representative of India to amend this so as to make it explicitly clear that we include all types of bases, without reservation, in our programme. Beyond that we do not believe it is necessary or desirable, or indeed feasible, to draw any distinction between one type of base and another type of base. In fact, we think the distinction which has been so laboured here is completely artificial. We do

(Mr. Dean, United States)

not think it has any substance. The disarmament programme as a whole must ensure that all military bases are disbanded, wherever they are located and no matter in whose territory they are.

The final question to which I would like to address myself this morning is the question of time-limits on a general and complete disarmament programme.

On Wednesday Mr. Zorin said:

"... I should still like to hear both from the Italian representative and the other representatives of the Western Powers whether they consider it necessary and possible to set a time-limit for the implementation of general and complete disarmament as a whole or whether they do not consider this possible. They must make this clear." (ENDC/PV.18, page 28)

I should like to give Mr. Zorin a crystal-clear answer. The United States believes that time-limits for the execution of agreed disarmament measures should be incorporated in any treaty concluded. We believe this would be equally true whether the treaty is for general and complete disarmament or for a lesser measure of disarmament. The time-limits so incorporated should be realistic and they should allow a reasonable period of time for carrying out and verifying each measure of disarmament. Thus we believe that a time-limit must be an integral part of any disarmament agreement reached. The failure to carry out and to verify an agreed disarmament measure within the agreed time-limit should, in our view, constitute a non-fulfilment of the agreement, although it will be necessary to provide a reasonable degree of flexibility to take account of unforeseen circumstances, or reports of the international disarmament organization, or others, on non-verification, and so forth.

The United States believes, too, that each stage of disarmament should also be accomplished within an agreed time-limit. We believe that this time-limit should be established in the light of the time required for the carrying out of each of the individual measures which go to make up that particular stage. The time for the total disarmament programme would be the sum of the time required for the execution of the separate stages. There is, however, one complicating factor which arises from the nature of the transition process.

It is quite clear that a subsequent stage would not be started until a decision had been reached that all measures in the preceding stage had been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage were, when appropriate, ready to operate.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Under ideal conditions the transition process should not, of course, in and of itself require any period of time and the programme should be so devised that the decisions required for transition could be, so to speak, concurrent with the execution of that particular stage. However, let me be clear: the requirement for such a decision cannot be cancelled out by imposing on it an arbitrary time limitation if experience should prove that that particular stage had not in fact been effectively carried out.

One procedure which might be worthy of our consideration in due course would be to provide for automatic transition from one stage to the next stage unless, after a reasonable specified period of time for the international disarmament organization's evaluation of the state of compliance, a party to the treaty should identify specific measures which had not been adequately implemented and verified, or preparations which had not been adequately made, and should request an appropriate delay to correct such inadequacies. However, this is a matter for future discussion and evaluation.

Our difference with the Soviet Union on the question of time-limits, at least in the past, has seemed to be that the Soviet Union wishes to establish an arbitrary time-limit in advance of agreement on the programme, in advance of agreement on the particular stage, and in advance of working out all the details of implementation. In our view, the periods of time required are a function of the control actions to be taken and of their character, which could only be determined with experience. In our view, disarmament should be completed just as expeditiously as possible and without any undue delays. However, until we have studied the actual details of the disarmament process and the time required to bring about simultaneously the strengthened peace-keeping machinery, it is, in our view, quite impossible to establish a firm time-limit either for an individual measure, for a stage, or for a programme as a whole.

To summarize, the position of the United States is that any agreement concluded in the disarmament field should be carried out within a specified period of time. The period of time so specified should be an integral part of that agreement. However, this period of time cannot be set until there is more detailed knowledge about precisely what is required for the physical process of disarming and the physical process of verification. Our objective should be to establish a reasonable time period for each stage in the light of these requirements and then to incorporate that period into the treaty.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Before leaving the question of time-limits, I should like to comment very briefly on the question of the three-year time period we have suggested for the first stage and the inference that has been drawn from it that the United States proposes a nine-year programme of disarmament. Let me point out that the three-year figure we have proposed for stage I is a very tentative figure based upon our present best estimate of the time that would be required to carry out the measures we, ourselves, have proposed. As in the process of negotiation the scope and content of the proposed stage expands or contracts, the time required for its completion would vary accordingly. If in the process of negotiation we can find simpler methods of doing the job than we have considered in our estimate, the same measures might require a shorter time than three years -- and if we find that to be the case, we will agree to it.

Estimates of the time required for stage II measures must be even more tentative, since they can be less precisely defined and understood until stage I measures have been agreed upon. However, in stage II we may find that the verification machinery already in operation will very considerably hasten the process, since it will be in existence already and will not have to be built up and established from the beginning, as in stage I. Thus at this stage in our definition of the job to be done it is quite impossible to say how long that job will take, but we approach the task in the spirit of the sooner the better.

Those were a few comments I wanted to make today on the subject of the treaty on general and complete disarmament which we are drafting. We are prepared to consider these and other views which have been or may be presented on this particular section of the treaty either in a drafting sub-committee, if that meets with the approval of the Conference, or with our co-Chairman.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): In my opinion the discussion on the first article of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament is coming to an end. The fruitful exchange of opinions which has taken place has emphasized that there are numerous points of agreement, or points on which agreement may be reached without too much difficulty, and this is undoubtedly a good thing. However, we cannot overlook the fact that a few problems have emerged with regard to which delegations continue to hold different opinions. We deem it necessary that before the co-Chairmen start to work out a joint text opinions should be expressed in connexion with such problems as well, since this would



(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

facilitate their work to a certain extent. We have had an opportunity to present the position of the Romanian delegation regarding the provisions which should be included in article 1. We should now like to refer to the liquidation of military bases on foreign territory.

During our debate the representatives of the United Kingdom and Italy have said that we should not include in article 1 a provision concerning the liquidation of military bases on foreign territory since, in Mr. Cavalletti's words:

"We know that, in dealing with disarmament, no distinction can be made between national bases and foreign bases." (ENDC/PV.18, page 19)

I must confess that we cannot agree with such a way of tackling this problem. Reality shows that there are fundamental differences between military bases on foreign territory and national bases. We believe that nobody who looks at things with an open mind can deny that bases on foreign territory constitute a well-defined military establishment which is quite different from national bases from a strategic military point of view as well as a political and juridical point of view. When we enumerate the fundamental obligations of States in connexion with disarmament -- and this is the purpose of article 1 -- we must mention separately those military phenomena which characterize the present situation; the expansion of the military establishments of certain States on foreign territory, with or without the consent of the sovereign territories, is such a phenomenon.

Military bases on foreign territory are not intended for purposes of defence, as is often asserted by those who plead in favour of their being maintained, but for purposes of quite another nature. Their main object is to serve as advanced points of departure for the unleashing of an armed attack against the States around which they are located. These bases are part of the strategy of intimidation and surprise attack. The existence of military bases gravely endangers the security of the very States on whose territory they are located. It is well known that the activities carried on at these bases are not controlled by the governments of the respective countries. In these circumstances the States on whose territory foreign bases exist inevitably incur the danger of recourses to military actions of which they may not even be aware. A conflict between an aggressor and his victim might thus extend over other countries as well. If, from a military point of view, foreign bases are an open threat not

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

only to the States against which they are directed but also to the States on whose territory they are located, they are also a permanent cause of worsening the international situation, increasing mistrust and suspicion and maintaining the cold war. In other words, they are a component part of the arms race, a factor of permanent threat to international peace and security. Numerous facts and events which have occurred in the post-war period are eloquent in this respect.

On the other hand, there exists a close link between the problem of liquidating all means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets and that of dismantling foreign military bases. By the very fact that they are located in the immediate vicinity of the borders of other States, foreign military bases acquire particular strategic importance, replacing to a great extent the strategic means of transport. Aggression by means of nuclear rocket weapons may be unleashed from these bases, thus considerably reducing the distance and the time necessary to hit the target.

What is the main argument of the delegations which stand against including in the treaty a provision concerning the abolition of military bases on foreign territory? Summing it up, this argument is included in the assertion that we must have balanced disarmament in which no party can at any moment secure advantages of any kind. In other words, if foreign military bases in Europe, Asia and Africa were dismantled, one of the parties concerned would secure certain advantages.

These views seem to us to be groundless; they are dictated by conceptions other than the concept that the essential problem which is now in the centre of international relations is general and complete disarmament. Those who assert such views forget, or pretend to forget, that the dismantling of military bases on foreign territories as provided for in the Soviet draft treaty is not an isolated fact, but is part of a whole series of measures which, once implemented, exclude the very idea of giving advantage to one side or another. These measures are interdependent. What are the circumstances in which the Soviet draft treaty provides for the dismantling of military bases on foreign territory? They are the destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and the reduction of military effectives and classical armaments.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Under such conditions we cannot speak about advantages being obtained or about unbalanced disarmament. A realistic and minute analysis of the Soviet draft cannot but stress the fact that it includes solid guarantees for the security of all States at any moment of the disarmament process. Such an analysis, unprejudiced on the one hand and animated by the wish that this Committee should arrive at concrete results on the other, would remove many suspicions hovering over this hall.

It is no secret to anybody that, while the Soviet Union enjoys superiority as concerns the means of delivering nuclear weapons -- a fact which has been admitted by most specialists in the United States and in the United Kingdom -- the two latter States and their allies have organized a wide network of military bases on foreign territories in the immediate neighbourhood of the Soviet Union and the other socialist States. It is therefore evident that if only the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets were destroyed and all, or part of, the military bases on foreign territories were maintained, this would be a serious drawback for the socialist States and a serious danger to their security. That is why we have to discuss the problem of foreign bases -- the necessity of their being abolished -- just as we have to discuss the necessity of liquidating means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets. In this respect it may also be said that if all weapons are liquidated, rocket weapons will be liquidated too. These weapons have acquired such importance that we are fully justified in speaking about them, especially in article 1, which summarizes the content of general and complete disarmament. For the same motives we must also mention the abolition of military bases on foreign territories.

In the light of these considerations, how can the fact of the maintenance of foreign bases while the means of delivering weapons to their targets are destroyed be reconciled with the unanimously recognized principle that during the disarmament process no State or group of States should obtain military advantages?

We fully agree with the opinion expressed here that the text of article 1 must be clear and that it should not contain uncertainties and formulas which could give rise to erroneous interpretations. That is why we are in favour of including in article 1 a special provision concerning the abolition of military bases on foreign territories. The Italian representative, Mr. Cavalletti, said

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

"We must keep to concrete facts ..." (ENDC/PV.18, page 17). We fully agree with this view. But how can such a reality as the existence of military bases on foreign territories be ignored?

The United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, opposing the stipulation on the liquidation of foreign bases, said that this would be "an unnecessary complication" (ibid., page 34). The United States representative said today he did not think it made any difference whether foreign bases were located within the territory or outside the territory of a particular party to the treaty. He further said that he did not believe it was necessary or desirable or indeed feasible to draw any distinction between one type of base and another type of base. It may be that it makes no difference for the country controlling these bases whether they are inside or outside, but surely it makes a big difference for the countries upon whose territory these bases are located and for those against which these bases are directed. However, this argument has to be developed further.

We think that clarification of the position of both sides in this matter, far from complicating things, will contribute to the finding of a proper solution. After all, why have we met here if not to discuss and solve problems which, by their very nature, are not at all easy to solve? We must not avoid them. We must exert all efforts with a view to elucidating and solving the problems facing us, difficult as they may be.

Although the United Kingdom representative has tried to convince us that "There is no justification at all, if one considers this dispassionately, for singling out this one particular item" (ibid.), we should like to recall that the problem of liquidating military bases on foreign territories concerns an ever greater number of States.

I should like to quote a few examples in this connexion. The Casablanca African Charter reads:

"We, the Heads of the African States, meeting in Casablanca from January 3rd to January 7th, 1961, conscious of our responsibilities towards the African Continent, proclaim our determination ... to discourage the maintenance of foreign troops and the establishment of bases which endanger the liberation of the African Continent ... "<sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> Casablanca Conference, January 1961, Information Department.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

The statement adopted by the Conference of Heads of State or Government of twenty-five non-aligned countries, including Burma, Ethiopia, India, the United Arab Republic and others, strongly emphasizes the necessity of military bases on foreign territories being dismantled, and I quote from this statement:

"The participating countries consider the establishment and maintenance of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries, particularly against their express will, a gross violation of the sovereignty of such States. They declare their full support to countries who are endeavouring to secure the vacation of these bases. They call upon those countries maintaining foreign bases to consider seriously their abolition as a contribution to world peace."

The draft resolution presented on 15 November 1960 at the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly by India and eleven other States (A/C.1/L.259) particularly envisages the dismantling of military bases on foreign territories.

That is why the Romanian delegation considers that article 1 of the draft treaty which we are now working out should provide for the abolition of all military bases on foreign territories.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): In his statement Mr. Dean, the representative of the United States, said in effect -- it is true that this point was raised by the representative of Romania, but I too should like to express the feelings of my country, which this question particularly concerns -- that the distinction between national military bases and military bases on foreign territory was only an artificial one.

It is of course possible that to the United States and their representative such bases are the same, because, whether they are on the national territory of the United States or on other territories, they are still American bases, and to the United States any difference is superficial. But a country like ours, around which military bases abound and at which their guns and rockets are aimed, has a very different feeling, and it is this feeling which we should like to see faithfully reported to the United States Government.

We are astonished that other countries, which have no foreign military bases at their frontiers, can allow the establishment of such bases against their neighbours. They do not have the feeling that there is a foreign force, the

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

bases of a great foreign Power, at their own frontiers. But our country, in which there are no foreign bases or foreign troops, is particularly conscious of this difference between foreign military bases and national military bases.

When we wish to talk to our neighbours, it is not to the American military bases on their territory that we wish to talk. It is to their peoples that we wish to talk, in order to make peace and come to an understanding with them, without having American guns trained on us. It is this feeling which we wish to be reported, in order to mark the difference which exists.

Some fifteen years have already passed since the end of the war, and these bases are still increasing in number in various countries. What would be thought if the other countries began to allow bases to be established on their own frontiers against their neighbours? Would that improve the international situation? Would not disputes between States be multiplied? Should we have a better atmosphere for the settlement of international questions?

That is why I wish to stress once again the need for our Conference to devote special attention to this important question. It is true that there has been some change, some improvement, in the United States position this morning. But I ask the United States delegation to make a further effort not to place foreign military bases and national military bases on the same footing. National military bases are those of the peoples concerned. Foreign military bases are an intervention against the States against which they are directed.

I appeal to the United States delegation, which is already taking a slightly less inflexible attitude, to make another effort to reach an understanding on this question.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to make two observations: one on the statement made today by the United States representative, and the other on the general results of the discussion on part 1 of the draft treaty.

My first observation refers to Mr. Dean's speech, in which he read out the statement published yesterday in Washington on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, the subject we debated at our plenary meeting yesterday.

I think all members of our Committee listened with great regret and disappointment to this official statement by the United States Government in answer to the question put by all members of our Conference, in particular by

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

those non-aligned countries which took the lead in putting it. The rejection of the proposal that no nuclear Power shall resume nuclear weapon tests while our negotiations in this Committee are going on is, of course, an extremely heavy blow to our whole Conference and does not help to strengthen peace. It reflects the policy of aggravating the international situation which unfortunately is still being pursued by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. We spoke about this yesterday.

But in connexion with this official statement I should like to point out to the members of the Committee that the actual reply of the United States Government is so worded that we absolutely fail to understand it; and I think its wording also sounds strange to all members of the Committee. It refers to the Soviet Union proposal, answers this proposal, and levels a charge at the Soviet Union. However, we all seem to be of sound mind and memory, and we are all witnesses that this question was not raised yesterday by the Soviet Union at all. I was simply amazed and thought my memory was perhaps deceiving me; but the official verbatim record of 12 April contains a statement by the representative of India, Mr. Lall, who said:

"I am directed by the Government of India today to appeal, in the name of the Government, against the resumption of nuclear tests by any country during the pendency of the Conference. The Government of India would take this opportunity to urge the three nuclear Powers to try again to reach an agreement. With all our capacity for indicating the urgency and the grave importance of the situation, we would request the nuclear Powers to take this appeal into consideration." (ENDC/PV.19, page 6).

And at the end of his statement the representative of India said:

"So the Government of India appeals to the countries directly concerned not to resume nuclear tests during the pendency of this Conference, so that the work of the Conference may go on. It will indeed be a heavy responsibility if the resumption of tests by any country should result in difficulties in the pursuit of our endeavour here." (Ibid)

This is written in black and white in the verbatim record. Why, then, should the United States Government be replying to some proposal by the Soviet Union? I fail to understand. After the statement by the representative of India, all the representatives of countries taking part in this Conference, all

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

the neutral countries taking part in our Committee, supported this proposal. Only two representatives, those of the United States and the United Kingdom, did not support this proposal. This is an actual fact, and the reply which has now been given by the United States Government was deliberately worded to present to the world an absolutely incorrect picture quite unrelated to reality. I do not consider this fortuitous.

The United States Government understands perfectly well, and so does the United Kingdom Government, that this demand that they shall not resume tests is now the demand of all the States in the world. The Government of India has done a fine thing in raising this question here at our Conference, and has received full support from all the members of the Conference but two. This is why the United States Government has decided not to say in its reply that it is rejecting this demand of virtually all the governments in the world -- at least of those represented at this Conference. The United States Government chooses this form for its reply so as to depict this proposal to the world as a Soviet proposal. No; such tricks cannot conceal your opposition to this demand, which is now being made by all the States of the world and which you refuse.

It embarrasses you to refuse the proposal of all the neutral States taking part here, so you shift your refusal to the Soviet Union, making out that you have a dispute with the Soviet Union. Nothing of the kind. Your dispute is with the governments of all the States in the world and of the countries present at this Conference, and you are refusing these governments, not the Government of the Soviet Union. Very well; be decent enough to recognize your responsibility in these matters, and honest enough before the world, and have the courage to give your answer directly to those who put this question and introduced this proposal. You have not this courage because your position is in the interest neither of peace nor of our Conference. That is the crux of the matter; that is why you avoid giving a straight answer to those who put this question.

The Soviet Union Government gave an affirmative answer to this question. Your answer is negative. The question, however, is raised not by us but -- as I said yesterday -- by life, and was put by the Government of India with the support of all the governments represented here. That is the difference between our positions. You, however, pretend to the world that this, if you please, is a trick of the Soviet Union. It is nothing of the kind. Have the courage to give a straight answer to the question put to you. Unfortunately you



(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

have not that courage. This only shows the weakness of your position. You cannot even give an open and direct answer to the question raised, not by us, but by life itself, and put by the Government of India and other non-aligned States. This is a very deplorable fact, which I did not think it right to ignore, because I believe that both our Conference and the world should know of these tricks of the United States Government, which is trying to wriggle out of the responsibility for its refusal.

Now I should like to say a few words about the argument on first article of the draft treaty, and about the questions put in the discussion. I suppose that what the United States representative said today on a number of these questions, in particular on time limits, clarifies the situation to some extent; and I now gather that the United States will not oppose what is said generally in our document: that a definite time limit should be laid down for the completion of the whole treaty on general and complete disarmament.

What that time limit should be may now be left an open question which we shall settle later with due regard to the discussion of the separate stages of disarmament, and to the general situation when we tackle the final draft of our treaty. But we consider it important to record that all of us believe it necessary to lay down a definite time limit for the whole treaty and for the fulfilment of the whole programme of general and complete disarmament. I do not think that the United States will now object to this; and though the explanations of this point raise some questions and doubts, nevertheless I think they are details which we shall be able to discuss later when we discuss the various stages of disarmament. What is important is that the United States and the other countries that have made statements here consider that the treaty should certainly have a deadline for its fulfilment.

I do not want to enter just now into a discussion of the various views expressed today by Mr. Dean. They contain a number of dubious passages, but I think that this is a matter for further discussion when we come to deal more specifically with some of the disarmament measures and with the stages of disarmament itself.

Concerning foreign military bases, I am not satisfied with Mr. Dean's reply to this question, nor with that given the day before yesterday by the United Kingdom representative; but I hardly think that further discussion of this matter would give any satisfactory results. It seems to me that our problem now

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

is to try to draft the first part of our treaty so as to find common ground between our positions. I think I shall get down to this with my co-Chairman the United States representative, who said today in his speech that he agreed to do so. I think it would be useful if we established now some deadline for introducing proposals relating to this first chapter of our draft treaty and to the proposals which have been submitted. We should then be able, presumably next week, to begin drafting a general document as part of our work of drafting a treaty. I should say, if this suits the United States, that we could fix this deadline at, say, Monday morning at 10, so that all ideas expressed by the various delegations could be taken into account in next week's work.

Thus it seems to me that we shall complete yet another stage of our labours and can thus pass on to discuss other questions connected with the first introductory part of our treaty, and can then proceed to deal further with specific stages of disarmament, when concrete proposals on concrete disarmament measures introduced both by us and by the United States and other States can be studied.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should just like to clarify a point after Mr. Zorin's interesting statement.

If I understood what he has just said about yesterday's meeting correctly, an appeal -- addressed particularly to the United States of America -- was made by all the delegations present here, concerning the discontinuance of tests. I am afraid the French interpretation I listened to did not accurately reflect Mr. Zorin's thought. Hence I should like to be allowed to study the record of the meeting before making more specific comments.

I have the impression, however, that Mr. Zorin may perhaps have misinterpreted some of the statements made at yesterday's meeting. I am sorry I cannot specify them at the moment. I think that the position of the Italian delegation was, in fact, explained very clearly and accurately in my statement yesterday.

Moreover, since the question of tests has been raised today, although it is not on the agenda, I should like to point out that at the end of yesterday's meeting the Italian delegation made a concrete proposal to try to bring about some progress in the matter and to lead us as quickly as possible towards an agreement on the discontinuance of tests. As you will remember, we asked for a

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

restricted, confidential meeting, with no record, to study the precise question which lies at the root of our difficulties in this matter of tests, namely, how international control can be reconciled with the need to eliminate all espionage.

I apologise for not being more specific. As I said, I should like to re-read the record of today's meeting before speaking again.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I listened with great interest to the intervention of the Soviet representative. It is a matter of great regret to my Government that, in spite of the repeated and, we believe, constructive and imaginative efforts which we have made over a three-year period to work out an adequate and effective treaty which would ban nuclear tests in all environments forever, we have met with a completely intransigent position on the part of the Soviet Union.

Let me make my Government's position clear to all the representatives at this Conference in order that there cannot be any mistake about it. The United States is not only prepared to sign, but wants to sign, an adequate and effective treaty which would ban all nuclear tests, in all environments -- outer space, atmosphere, high altitude, on or under water, underground -- without any restrictions. All we ask is that that treaty be along the lines of the very carefully worked out draft of 18 April 1961, (ENDC/9) which the United Kingdom and the United States tabled at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, and which has been circulated to all Members of the United Nations and to the members of this Conference.

We proposed a number of amendments to that draft treaty. We did so because of statements made to us by Soviet representatives that if we would meet them on certain points that would materially clear the path to the signing of a treaty. I think we have made some twenty highly constructive and imaginative proposals in this respect.

In making some of these proposals, we had to take very real political risks; in an attempt to get this treaty we have gone far beyond the present state of science in these fields. When we decided to remove the threshold and have the treaty apply to all events, including underground events, we did not ask for more control posts or more on-site inspections. This again was a major offer which we made in an effort to get the Soviet Union to sign an agreement.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

We have offered to divide the Soviet Union into seismic and aseismic areas and to take that into account in establishing the number of inspections. This would mean that there would be a very limited number of inspections in the heartland of the Soviet Union, which is principally non-earthquake territory. We have repeatedly asked the Soviet Union to comment specifically on what is wrong with our treaty or with our various proposals. We have repeatedly asked the Soviet Union to tell us what is wrong scientifically with the report of the 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts (EXP/NUC/28) in which they concurred. The United Kingdom and the United States have been negotiating with the Soviet Union on this matter practically every day for the past three years. During all this time we have kept the Conference open. We have at all times told our Soviet colleagues that we are quite willing to receive their ideas and to sit down and discuss this matter with them.

Now it was the Soviet Union which, by its series of tests last September, unilaterally violated the moratorium -- a moratorium which the United States had scrupulously observed. It would have been a perfectly normal reaction for the United States to resume tests last September, although we had not prepared for them. However, in an effort to save the world from further nuclear tests and in an effort to act in a completely responsible manner, we called upon our scientists to study this treaty again. We presented this treaty and its principles to the United Nations. We have at all times been open to suggestions on it.

We now find ourselves in this somewhat unfortunate position: we have made approximately twenty proposals and compromises and advances to the Soviet Union in an effort to get a treaty; the Soviet Union not only has refused to accept any of these but now even refuses to accept the fifteen control posts on its territory which it had previously accepted, refuses to accept any on-site inspections on its territory -- inspections to which it had previously agreed -- and, without adducing any scientific evidence, states that national detection systems are sufficient. Having made these major proposals and compromises over this long period of time, while the Soviet Union made none, we now find ourselves in the position of being told, "Your position is rigid; you will not move". Therefore we now believe that perhaps we should have tested last September. If we had tested last September, the world would have understood the reasons and we should now be in the same position as the Soviet Union,

(Mr. Dean, United States)

which conducted a complete series of tests last September and is now examining the results in its laboratories.

This is a matter of deep regret to my Government. In fact, as President Kennedy said, the greatest disappointment he has had so far during his period as President has been his failure to conclude with the Soviet Union an adequate and effective agreement to ban all nuclear tests. It is a matter of utmost concern to us that, with respect to the proposal that has been put forward by the representative of India and concurred in by some of the delegations -- I am not sure the record shows that all the delegations except those of the United Kingdom and the United States concurred, but I shall not quibble about that point -- the United States cannot today accept another uninspected and uncontrolled moratorium. We can accept an adequate and effective treaty with international control. We are prepared to sign such a treaty today, and that will put a stop to all further tests. But I am sorry to say that we cannot agree to an uninspected and uncontrolled moratorium. We say this with the greatest respect to the numerous distinguished delegations at this Conference. We wish there was some way whereby they could convince the Soviet Union to depart from its present completely intransigent position.

We are quite prepared to have the Soviet Union tell us in what respects we are scientifically incorrect. It has never done this. I therefore repeat to the representative of the Soviet Union and to the other representatives at this table that it is with the utmost regret that the United States cannot accept an uncontrolled and uninspected moratorium.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I should like first to speak very briefly on the question of nuclear tests and then to revert to the discussion on part I of the treaty.

I really have nothing to add to what the representative of the United States has just said in reply to the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union. But frankly I am fascinated by Mr. Zorin's tactics in regard to questions. I said yesterday that I did not wish to make debating points. But if I am led down this path by Mr. Zorin, then please forgive me on this occasion and remember who is leading me astray.

Yesterday I was the villain in that I had chosen to answer at once a question which I thought deserved a frank and a completely honest answer. Today it was

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

the turn of the representative of the United States. He gave a very similar answer today, although in much more fluent language than I could have used, to the answer which I gave yesterday. But the representative of the Soviet Union criticised him very strongly for having replied to the representative of the Soviet Union rather than to the representative of India. The representative of the Soviet Union reminded us of what the representative of India had said yesterday. It is perfectly true that the representative of India did make an appeal -- I believe a very genuine appeal -- and I would say with all due respect that he was in a better position to make it than was the representative of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Mr. Zorin himself went further than this yesterday. At yesterday's meeting Mr. Zorin went to the trouble of repeating a statement made by the Soviet Government on 28 November 1961, as follows:

"It goes without saying that an agreement by all nuclear States not to conduct any kind of nuclear tests while the negotiations are going on would contribute to the success of the negotiations."

(ENDC/11, page 6)

A bit further on Mr. Zorin said:

"I confirm this statement of the Soviet Government, and I consider it necessary that we should hear in the Committee the reply of the United States and the United Kingdom to this vitally important question : ..." (ENDC/PV.19, page 21)

That is precisely what the representative of the United States and I have just done. I was criticized because I did it too soon, and my United States colleague was criticized because he replied to the representative of the Soviet Union rather than to the representative of India. This shows how difficult it is to please our Soviet colleague. We do our best, and we shall continue to do our best. But that is precisely the position. As I say, it is only a debating point and I apologise for having been led down this path, but when Mr. Zorin accuses my United States colleague of trying to wriggle out of making his negative reply to India rather than to the Soviet Union, one really must answer that the wriggling is in fact being done by another gentleman.

As I say, I think there is really nothing further to be said in regard to this particular aspect of testing, which is a very serious point. I wish we could make progress. I am still willing, anxious and ready to do so, either in this forum or in our Sub-Committee. I personally welcomed the suggestion of the

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

representative of Italy for an informal meeting on this matter. Anything that can help us will be valuable and very welcome from the point of view of the Western nations. But of course what I said yesterday as to why we have been unable to make progress is still valid. If there is no agreed political basis of discussion the prospects are indeed slim. But I shall be very happy to take part in an informal meeting if that is the desire of the Committee.

Now may I turn for one moment to the question of part I of our treaty on disarmament? I listened with great care this morning to the various suggestions put forward. I was very interested in what the representative of Bulgaria had to say. I thought his remarks contained some very constructive and extremely helpful passages, and I was very glad that he concentrated considerably on the points of agreement. This, as I have repeatedly said to the Committee, is my own approach to this matter and one which I hope we can all follow.

We have again had a certain amount of discussion on the question of foreign bases, and I do not propose to labour that again this morning. I would only say to the representative of Romania that I thought he was arguing an unreal case, for he was arguing, as I understood him, about the harmfulness of foreign bases. That may be so, but it is not, I think, a matter which it is necessary for us in this Committee to argue, because what we are arguing about is the elimination of all bases, and therefore, whether foreign bases be good or bad, if we succeed in our work they will be eliminated, just as will others. Therefore we are all agreed on the elimination of foreign bases as of national bases. Consequently, it seems to me unreal and unnecessary to labour this point to the extent to which it has again been laboured by the representative of Romania this morning.

I was glad to note what the representative of the Soviet Union said in regard to part I. Although he told us he was not satisfied with the answers of the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of foreign bases, I think he feels -- as I understood his remarks -- that we have reached a position where we can press on with regard to this part.

It is perfectly true that there are many ways in which one could overcome this particular difficulty, which certainly need not be a major one. The representative of India, speaking the other day, suggested certain words.

(ENDC/PV.18, page 37) I think he suggested, "including bases whether domestic or foreign". That was one suggestion. If one took the part of the Soviet

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

text which says "the dismantling of all kinds of foreign military bases" (ENDC/2, page 2), one could, as I think I suggested before, merely delete the word "foreign".

Again, if one wanted to be more explicit one could say, "the dismantling of all kinds of military bases, including foreign bases". There are many ways of doing it and by which I believe the wishes expressed in this Committee from different aspects can all be met. Certainly it is not a matter which, I think, need inhibit us in any way or hold up our work.

In the same way, it seemed to me quite clear, after listening to my United States colleague, that the question of whether we refer to "Obligations" or "Outline of obligations" or "Objectives" is another matter which can be readily solved.

While the question of time limits obviously still presents certain problems and difficulties for us -- the arguments here, I think, have to be developed later -- they certainly need not delay the framing of this next article of our treaty. I was therefore very glad when the representative of the Soviet Union said that we ought now to be in a position to formulate agreement on this next item of our work. He suggested a deadline for the submission of further proposals. I welcome that suggestion because I think this is useful and an indication that we are making progress in what is really our main task. I shall be delighted, as I am sure will others of my colleagues, to hand this task over as a week-end task, to our co-Chairmen, to let them get on with it and work while the rest of us relax. I am always only too ready to make such propositions, and when I know I am supporting the representative of the Soviet Union in doing it, that gives me added pleasure. Therefore I would like, if I may, to end on a happy note on this occasion, and to hope that I have not once more incurred Mr. Zorin's displeasure.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I was very happy to hear Mr. Zorin say that, if it were the wish of the Conference, he thought the two co-Chairmen could now get together and try to work out an agreement on part I and the objectives. A time limit of 10 a.m. on Monday next would be quite agreeable to me. It did occur to me that since the week-end is included some representatives might prefer 10 a.m. on Tuesday, but if 10 a.m. on Monday would be agreeable to everyone else it would be quite agreeable to me.



Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): If there are no objections, let us agree on 10 a.m. next Monday as the deadline.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): I think there is agreement that 10 a.m. on Monday next should be set as the time limit for the submission of amendments to article 1 of the draft treaty.

It was so decided.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I shall literally only detain the Conference for a few minutes. I must say that the explanations that have been submitted just now by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom merely confirm what I was saying at the beginning of our discussion of this matter. Since, however, the United Kingdom representative referred to my statement of yesterday, I will venture to quote from it myself, and rather more fully than he did.

At yesterday's meeting I said:

"That is why the thought expressed by the representative of India -- and in essence supported by all the speakers -- ..."

(ENDC/PV.19, page 20)

But today Mr. Cavalletti made a remark which suggests that he was not one of those who yesterday supported this idea. That is how I understood him today, but he promised to clarify this latter. Yesterday I said this:

"That is why the thought that has just been voiced by the representative of India, and supported in its essence by all the speakers, to the effect that we must do all we can to see that testing is not resumed while negotiations are going on in our Committee -- I think that this statement, this proposal deserves our most serious consideration at this juncture. This is a minimal step that could avert further dangerous developments in world events" (ibid.).

Thus I spoke only about the proposal that had been introduced by the representative of India and supported by almost all the speakers. In other words, this confirms what I was saying only a few minutes ago and which naturally no-one could refute, because it is a hard fact. But the United Kingdom representative quoted a further extract from my speech, the first sentence of my reference to the statement of 28 November:

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

"It goes without saying that an agreement by all nuclear States not to conduct any kind of nuclear tests while the negotiations are going on ..." (ENDC/11, page 6)

That is what Mr. Godber quoted. But what I cannot understand is why he did not quote the second part of my reference, which followed immediately:

"The Soviet Government, although it has carried out considerably fewer nuclear weapon tests than the United States, the United Kingdom and France, is nevertheless prepared to give such an undertaking, if the other States do likewise" (ibid).

This Mr. Godber did not quote.

I further stated:

"I confirm this statement by the Soviet Government, and I consider it necessary that we should hear in the Committee the reply of the United States and the United Kingdom to this vitally important question ..." (ENDC/PV.19, page 21)

It is not we who have raised the question; the question has really been raised by life itself, voiced by the Government of India, and supported by nearly all the members of our Conference. To this question we gave an affirmative reply. We gave it as far back as November 1961, and I confirmed it yesterday. The reply of the United States and the United Kingdom was negative. I intended today merely to emphasize that it answers, not a question which the Soviet Union has raised, but a question raised by nearly all of the States of the world and put into definite words at our Conference by the representative of India.

I regret that the United States Government, in its official reply, said not a single word to indicate that this question had been raised at the Conference of the Committee of Eighteen Nations on Disarmament by the representative of India, and supported by all the non-aligned States and a number of other countries.

That is all I spoke about. In other words, I emphasized that the United States Government had not the courage to tell the world that it was giving a negative answer to the question that had been raised by all these States.

I cannot agree with the United Kingdom representative that I am never satisfied. When I get a favourable answer I am as satisfied as anyone else. But I think that in this case neither my dissatisfaction nor that of the Soviet

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Union matters. Mr. Godber said that the Soviet Union is hard to please. It is not pleasing the Soviet Union that matters, but satisfying the demand of vast numbers of mankind, of world opinion, and of the overwhelming majority of the world's governments. That is what matters. You have failed to satisfy, not the Soviet Union, but world opinion and the majority of the world's governments. That is the whole point.

About the position of the United States I can agree with Mr. Dean, who said today that we are in a difficult situation. I can agree with that. Here we and the United States representative are of one mind absolutely.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): One of the most endearing qualities of Mr. Zorin is his almost feminine determination to have the last word. Normally, I am very agreeable that he should do so. On this occasion I only say to him that I am sorry that I omitted one sentence from the quotation of his statement. It was not really the relevant sentence. I had already dealt with that in previous interventions, and I certainly do not want to labour what I have already said. I apologize for making light of these things. Of course, this is a desperately serious matter. But we all know the position which has been reached and I do not think it is for the Soviet Union to accuse the West in this regard. But in so far as the question was concerned, if one is to take a strict chronological order, then I would have thought that since Mr. Zorin was quoting from a Soviet statement of 28 November 1961, it was more courteous to reply to the Soviet Union, which had formulated its proposal earlier, than to reply to the representative of India, who formulated his statement only yesterday. If I have rendered discourtesy to the representative of India, I apologize; but I would assure him that I still hold to the view which I expressed the last time.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its twentieth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. J. Hajek, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, the United States, Romania, the Soviet Union, Italy and the United Kingdom.

"In accordance with the agreement on procedural arrangements (ENDC/INC.1, paragraphs 3 and 4) adopted by the Conference on 14 March 1962, all documents and final verbatim records of the Conference distributed as at 31 March will be available to all Members of the United Nations and for public use on 19 April 1962, through the United Nations Secretariat at Geneva and New York.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 16 April 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.